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In this paper we construct a game-theoretic model to analyze firms¡¦ partial compatibility
choices. The quality of a hybrid system depends on the minimum of the compatibility levels
chosen by firms. We find that, depending on the investment cost, the compatibility level
could be incompatibility or partial compatibility. When the investment cost is very small,
firms¡¦ optimal compatibility levels are partial. If the investment cost is relatively large, then
firms will choose incompatibility. These results offer an explanation for why firms do not
produce components which are fully compatible with their rivals¡¦.
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1. Introduction 
        A “system” can be viewed as a composite good made up of components that are of 
little  or  no  value  separately  to  consumers.    We  often  observe  that  components  of  a 
system  have  different  terms  of  lives,  e.g.,  printer  and  toner.    This  paper  calls  the 
component with a longer duration as the durable component and the component with a 
shorter duration as the non-durable component. 
        In  the literature,  there are many  pioneering works including  Farrell  and Saloner 
(1986),  Matutes  and  Regibeau  (1988),  Economides  (1989),  Chou  and  Shy  (1990) 
utilizing different  approaches to  investigate firms’ compatibility  decisions and  related 
issues.    The issues relating partial compatibility have not got much attention up until 
now, with Chou and Shy (1993) being the first to investigate partial compatibility.    They 
defined a partial compatibility degree as the proportion of the software written for one 
hardware technology which can be used on the other hardware technology.    de Palma et 
al.  (1999)  endogenized  the  compatibility  degree  and  defined  it  as  the  proportion  of 
consumers joined the same network who only used the other brand’s product. 
        Different from the above literature, this paper defines compatibility level from the 
viewpoint of quality.    Although a hybrid system (a system made up of different brands’ 
components) can bring consumers utilities under compatibility, it is easy to observe that 
there are often some unexpected problems in using hybrid systems.    This means that 
there is vertical differentiation between purebred (a system made up of components with 
the  same  brand)  and  hybrid  systems.    The  quality  difference  between  hybrid  and 
purebred systems intuitively depends on the compatibility level between brands.    The 
higher the compatible level is between brands, the smaller the quality difference will be 
between purebred  and  hybrid  systems.    From  this  point  of  view,  compatibility  level 
choices are equivalent to the quality choices of hybrid systems. 
        In  this paper  we consider a duopolistic  market where  firms produce the durable 
components  and  the  non-durable  components.    The  durable  components  bring  some 
utilities for consumers.    In contrast, the non-durable components alone are useless for 
consumers, but they can be used to upgrade the durable components.    An example that 
fits the previous description is an all-in-one printer.    An all-in-one printer can be used as 
a printer, a scanner, a fax machine, and a copier.    Consumers can use it as a scanner and   2 
a sending-fax machine without a toner.    A toner alone is useless for consumers, but it 
can be used to upgrade an all-in-one printer.    We find that firms’ optimal compatibility 
levels  are  partial  when  the  investment  cost  is  very  small.    If  the  investment  cost  is 
relatively large, firms will choose incompatibility.    These results offer an explanation for 
why  firms  do  not  produce  components  which  are  fully  compatible  with  their  rivals’ 
components. 
        The paper is organized as follows.    We introduce the model in the second section.   
The third and fourth sections analyze the consumers’ and firms’ behaviors in the second 
and first periods, respectively.    Section 5 investigates firms’ optimal compatibility level 
choices.    Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
        If firm  ) 2 , 1 ( = i i   chooses its unilateral compatibility levels to be  i k   ) 1 0 ( ≤ ≤ i k , 
the quality of the hybrid system is
1 
  p h kQ Q = , 
  ] , min[ 2 1 k k k = , 
where  p Q   and  h Q   are the corresponding qualities of the purebred and hybrid systems 
respectively and  k   is the compatibility level between brands. 
        The quality of  a  hybrid system is  determined by the  minimum of the unilateral 
compatibility levels chosen by the firms.    If any firm makes its components to be less 
compatible with its rival’s components, then the compatibility level between brands and 
hence the quality of a hybrid system decrease. 
        Full compatibility occurs only upon both firms’ agreements ( 1 2 1 = = = k k k ), the 
quality  of  the  hybrid  system  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  purebred  system.    Another 
extreme case is that when one of the two firms uses a secret technology in producing 
components ( 0 1 = k   or  0 2 = k ), the components produced by the different firms cannot 
be used together.    Incompatibility occurs.    When  1 ] , min[ 0 2 1 < < k k , the quality of the 
                                                    
1  A similar assumption appeared in Economides (1999).    The quality of a composite good is assumed to 
be the minimum of the qualities of the components when the components are produced by different firms.   3 
hybrid system is positive, but smaller than that of the purebred one, and this is partial 
compatibility. 
        The quality of a purebred system is assumed to be 1 in this paper and the quality of 
the hybrid system is therefore equal to the compatibility level between brands. 
        Durable component 1 and durable component 2 reside at points 0 and 1, respectively.   
Consumers (in the first period) are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] with density 
1. Let t denote consumers’ preferences to durable components.    A consumer located at t 
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Here,  0 u   is  the  basic  utility  of  using  a  durable  component,  and 
i
d p   is  the price  of 
durable component  i.    Besides,  0 u   is  assumed  to  be  sufficiently  large  such  that  the 
market of the durable component is covered. 
        In the second period, consumers decide whether to buy a non-durable component to 
upgrade their durable components.    Consumers (in the second period) are heterogeneous 
in their valuations on the qualities of upgraded systems.    Let r denote the index of such a 
consumer’s valuation.    We assume that r is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] 
with density 1.    A consumer (in the second period) indexed with r gains the following 
additional utility when upgrading his durable component. 
  nd p r r u − = θ ) ( 2 ,                          (2) 
where  θ   ( 1 = θ   for  a  purebred  system;  1 ≤ = k θ   for  a  hybrid  system)  denote  the 
quality parameter and  nd p   is the price of the non-durable component. 
We assume that firms (in the second period) can distinguish consumers into groups 
of durable component 1 and durable component 2 owners so that they are able to exercise 
price  discrimination.
2    Under  this  assumption,  firms  are  motivated  to  offer  a  lower 
non-durable component price so as to promote the acceptance of hybrid systems. 
        There is no production cost in producing the durable component and the non-durable 
                                                    
2  Because two symmetric  firms will set the same non-durable component price and a hybrid system’s 
quality can not be higher than that of the purebred system, hybrid systems could be purchased only if firms   4 
component.    Firms  incur  investment  cost,  fk ,  if  they  choose  k  as  their  unilateral 
compatibility levels, where  0 > f . 
        The  game  proceeds  in  two  periods.    In  the  first  period,  firms  decide  their 
compatibility levels first and then price their durable components.    Consumers purchase 
durable  components  finally.    In  the  second  period,  firms  price  their  non-durable 
components  first  and  then  consumers  purchase  the  non-durable  components.    In  the 
following we will use backward induction to derive the subgame perfect equilibrium. 
 
3. Consumers’ and Firms’ Optimal Choices in the Second Period 
        Since the compatibility level is determined as the lower unilateral compatibility level 
chosen by one of the two firms and a higher unilateral compatibility level would result in 
a higher investment cost, the two firms choose the same unilateral compatibility level, so 
that  2 1 k k k = = . 
        Given the compatibility level is  k , the second period utility function of a consumer 
who owns durable component 1 in the first period is 
  ] 0 ), ( , max[ 2
2 1 s p rk p r U nd nd − − − = , 
where 
i
nd p   (i=1,2) is the price of the non-durable components produced by firm i and 
2 s   is firm 2’s special discount for the consumers who own durable component 1. 
        According to the utility function, the consumers owning durable component 1 with 
) 1 ( ) ( 2
2 1 k s p p r nd nd − + − ≥   will buy non-durable component 1 in the second period (let 
us call such consumers the loyal consumers), consumers owning durable component 1 
with  ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2
2 1
2
2 k s p p r k s p nd nd nd − + − < ≤ −   will buy non-durable component 2 (let 
us  call  such  consumers  the  switching  consumers),  and  consumers  owning  durable 
component 1 with  k s p r nd ) ( 2
2 − <   do not buy a non-durable component.    Similarly, 
the  loyal  (switching)  consumers  of  firm  2  have  quality  valuations  that  satisfy 
) 1 ( ) ( 1
1 2 k s p p r nd nd − + − ≥   ( k s p r nd ) ( 1
1 − ≥ ), where  1 s   is firm 1’s special discount for 
the consumers who own durable component 2. 
                                                                                                                                                            
offer consumers special discounts.   5 
        From the previous analysis, given that firm 1’s market share in the first period is  σ , 
firms’ second period profits functions are: 
  )]
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Solving the first-order conditions of the above profit functions yield the firms’ optimal 
pricing stated as follows. 
 
Proposition  1  Given  that  the  compatibility  level  is  k ,  a  firm’s  optimal  non-durable 
component prices are as follows. 
(1) The price of the non-durable component to the loyal consumers is  ) 4 ( ) 1 ( 2 k k − − ; 
(2)  The  price  of  the  non-durable  component  to  the  switching  consumers  is 
) 4 ( ) 1 ( k k k − − . 
 
        When  the  compatibility  level  is  higher,  the  non-durable  component  price 
competition becomes  more severe, and  the non-durable component price  to the  loyal 
consumers decreases. 
        From  [Proposition  1],  firms’  optimal  pricing  under  full  compatibility  and 
incompatibility are also quite clear.    Firstly, the non-durable component price is 0 under 
full compatibility.    Because the two brands’ non-durable components are homogenous 
under this situation, a perfect Bertrand competition occurs.    Secondly, the non-durable 
component price is  2 1   under incompatibility.    This means that firms would charge a 
monopoly price to their loyal consumers if the rival’s non-durable component cannot be 
used together with its durable component. 
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4. Consumers’ and Firms’ Optimal Choices in the First Period 
        Note  that  firms  offer  the  same  price  scheme  in  the  second  period  (as  stated  in 
[Proposition 1]).    A consumer is hence going to face the same scenario in the second 
period  no  matter  which  brand’s  durable  component  he  buys.    This  implies  that 
consumers’ purchase decisions of durable components are independent of the (expected) 
second period outcome.    The first period utility function of a consumer located at t is 
  )] 1 ( , max[
2
0
1 t p u t p u U d d o − − − − − = . 
Firm 1’s market share in the first period is therefore  2 ) 1 (
2 1
d d p p + − = σ . 
        Substitute the market share into equation (3.1) and (3.2), the firms’ second period 
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Solving the first-order conditions of the profit functions simultaneously, the prices of the 
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        Durable component prices increase in compatibility level.    Because the non-durable 
component  price  competition  becomes  more  severe,  the  profits  from  selling  the 
non-durable component to the loyal consumers decrease in compatibility level.    This 
reduces a firm’s incentive to strive for higher market share in the first period. 
 
5. Firms’ Compatibility Decisions 
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Solving  the  first-order  conditions  of  the  above  profit  function  yields  firms’  optimal 
compatibility level choices stated as [Proposition 2].   7 
 
Proposition 2 (1) If  f   is almost zero, the firms’ optimal compatibility level choices are 
nearly  7 4 ; 
(2) If  16 1 > f , the firms choose incompatibility. 
 
        From the previous analysis, raising the compatibility level results in a softer durable 
component price competition and a tougher non-durable component price competition.   
Full  compatibility  result  in  the  highest  durable  component  price,
3  but  there  is, 
nevertheless, perfect Bertrand competition in the non-durable component market.    On 
the other hand, incompatibility will help firms to lock-in those consumers who purchased 
their durable component in the first period, but the toughest durable component price 
competition would occur under this situation.    Firms  face the above tradeoff as they 
make  compatibility  level  decisions.    [Proposition  2]  indicates  that  firms’  optimal 
compatibility levels are partial when the investment cost is very small.    This implies that 
choosing full compatibility is always unprofitable for firms.    If the investment cost is 
relatively large, firms will choose incompatibility.    These results offer an explanation for 




        This paper proposes a model to analyze firms’ compatibility level choices in the 
markets of durable components and non-durable components. 
        We find that firms’ optimal compatibility levels are partial when the investment cost 
is  very  small.    If  the  investment  cost  is  relatively  large,  then  firms  will  choose 
incompatibility.    These  results  offer  an  explanation  for  why  firms  do  not  produce 
components which are fully compatible with their rivals’ components. 
 
                                                    
3  From  equation  (5),  the  price  of  the  durable  component  is  the  highest  when  firms  choose  full 
compatibility.   8 
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